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STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Department of Human Services, 
Intervenor, Appellee, 
CASE NO. 920701-CA 
PRIORITY 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
RESPONSE TO STATE'S STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The Appellant Appeals a Rule 60(b) Motion requesting Relief 
from the Final Judgment of Honorable David S. Young on 21 October 
1992. The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over final 
orders of other agencies as well as the Third District Court 
pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
The trial Court clearly abused it's discretion by not having 
any substantial evidence before it to allow ORS to Intervene and 
set Aside Appellant's Withhold and Deliver Order. There was no 
Notice sent to Appellant and no arguments allowed before the Court 
and therefore denied Appellant due process and violated Article 1 
1 
sec. 7 of the Utah State Constitution. 
The Court did not act correctly in allowing the ORS to 
Intervene. Intervention has conditions and certain rules and 
regulations and standards that were not present. The ORS also was 
acting in violation of it's own Rules and Regulations for case 
closures, see CFR 303.11(a)(9) & Human Services, Recovery Services, 
R527-273-1 B.1.3. 
The Court should not have allowed the Setting Aside of the 
Appellant's Withhold and Deliver as a matter of res judicata. The 
Appellant already had adjudicated the collection of her support 
monies and was receiving her support monies. 
The Utah Statute 62A-11-404 (1989 & Supp. 1992) & 62A-11-414 
is facially unconstitutional and vague as to terms and conditions 
and has been used arbitrarily and capriciously, without any 
standard for reasonableness being applied in this case. 
All matters presently before this Court are proper before this 
Court, timely, and have been raised in the lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Appellant responds and hereby objects to the State's 
Statement of the Facts. 
1. The Plaintiff and the Appellant separated on 14 November 1990. 
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The Plaintiff then filed for Divorce on 26 March 1991. For eighteen 
months previous to the State's intervention, both agreed to allow 
Plaintiff to pay his Child Support and Alimony voluntarily -
without interference by the State. 
2. On 27 March 1992, the Plaintiff was granted a Default Divorce 
Decree which the Appellant appealed to this Court from said Decree, 
and this Court summarily reversed on 3 March 1993 for fraud and 
duress (Case No. 92-0523CA). The District Court granted Appellant 
a Extra Ordinary Writ of Relief and there is only in place a 
temporary support order at this time (Case No. 910491255). 
3. The Plaintiff had become behind in his support monies $776.00 
within less than 3 months after the Decree was granted and stopped 
sending any support monies to Appellant completely by June of 1992. 
4. Sometime during June of 1992, the Plaintiff's fifteen year old 
daughter contacted the Plaintiff whom she had not seen for over 
eighteen months to inquire why he was making things so difficult. 
The Plaintiff told his daughter that he "had a new life and that 
the family would just have to cjo on Welfare". 
5. On 30 June 1992, the Appellant sought the help of the District 
Court to collect her support monies from Plaintiff. The Honorable 
David S. Young granted the Appellant her Withhold and Deliver on 30 
June 1992, as the Appellant had already brought an Order to Show 
Cause Hearing on her own and reduced the arrearages to judgment. 
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6# The day that Appellant received her remedy through the 
District Court, 30 June 1992, Commissioner Michael Evans told the 
Plaintiff that the voluntary choice to send support monies was now 
"out of his hands" and in the Courts. 
7. The next day, 1 July 1992, the Plaintiff applied for 
assistance to collect the Appellant's support obligations, which he 
had refused to send voluntarily. 
8. The Appellant was told by one of the Clerks at Third District 
Court on 16 July 1992, that ORS had filed a Ex-parte Motion to 
Intervene. 
9. The Appellant went to ORS and talked with Shanna Hair and 
Renee Jimenez and told them both that Plaintiff had just applied to 
delay and defraud the Appellant of her support monies. 
10. The Appellant gave ORS a letter in writing that she did not 
want her child support collected through the State as she feared 
she would not receive the full amount. 
11. Since the Intervention of the ORS, the Plaintiff is $4,197.00 
in arrears to the Appellant and her children's detriment as 
Appellant is not receiving any form of assistance from the State, 
nor is she employed. 
12. The Appellant received by mail a copy of an Ex-parte Motion to 
Intervene, but no Notice of Hearing as now appears in the 
Appellee's Brief. Furthermore, Commissioner Thomas Arnett stated on 
4 
19 August 1992, that "there was no Notice in the Courts file" 
(Appellant's Exhibit J). 
13. The Commissioner was in full agreement with the Appellant that 
the State had no right to Intervene when Appellant and her five 
minor children neither receive, nor want State Welfare. 
14. The Appellant had argued the State's right to Intervene, and 
also at that time stated that she had not received Notice of what 
the hearing was for, nor had she received the State's Motion to Set 
Aside Defendant's Withhold and Deliver. 
15. The Appellant brought forward the issues of privacy, previous 
conduct of parties and intent of Plaintiff to evade his support 
obligations. Issues of right to contract, standing of the State's 
right to Intervene and due process violation, as well as the Open 
Court's Clause. 
16. Commissioner Arnett then stated that the State had already 
been granted the right to Intervene and only the Setting Aside was 
at issue for this Hearing. This Motion for Setting Aside Withhold 
and Deliver was never received by the Appellant. 
17. The Appellant then filed a Motion for Relief Rule 60(b) from 
State's Intervention, and Judge Young denied the Appellant her 
request for a Hearing on this Motion 22 September 1992. 
18. The Plaintiff is now $4,197.00 in arrears and the Appellant 
and her children have been irreparably injured as a result of the 
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collusion of the State and Plaintiff, and has never received the 
Court ordered amount of $900.00 per month since the Intervention. 
Barlow v. Collins. 397 U.S. 159 (1970). 
RESPONSE TO SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant is appealing from a Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief 
which is timely and proper before this Court. 
A Rule 60(b) can be made up to three months after a final 
order. The Appellant filed timely in the lower Court. 
A Rule 60(b)(3) states that "relief may be obtained if the 
judgment was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party". 
Rule 60(b)(6) "if it is no longer equitable that judgment 
should have application". 
Rule 60(b)(7) "any other reason justifying relief from 
operation of judgement". 
The trial Court abused it's discretion by not allowing the 
Appellant to have her side heard. To explain the previous conduct 
of the parties and the fraudulent reasons for Plaintiff's 
application to the State. 
The Court abused it's discretion by acting arbitrarily and 
capriciously with no substantial evidence ever submitted to the 
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Court to allow the State Standing or to determine an "injury in 
fact" and "zone of interests" of the State. 
The only ones who have suffered as a result of the 
Intervention are the persons whose interests the State contends to 
be protecting, but the fact remains that the Plaintiff has been 
allowed to advance $4,197.00 in arrearages, with the State's 
assistance. 
The Court asked for no proffers of proof and no testimony was 
given in support of State's Intervention and the Appellant moves 
this Court to reverse the lower Courts decision and grant a 
reversal on Appellant's Rule 60(b) Motion and Order the State to 
pay the $4,197.00 in arrearages that Appellant and her children 
have suffered. 
ARGUMENT 
RESPONSE TO POINT I OF APPELLEE 
The Court has jurisdiction to hear cases from a final 
appealable Order. A rule 60(b), of which the lower Court denied to 
Appellant, is a final appealable Order from which an appeal may be 
taken. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). The Appellant filed her appeal timely and has shown an 
obvious abuse of discretion by the lower Court in which the 
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Appellant has proven that if all evidence would have been heard 
before the lower Court at a Hearing or trial, would have resulted 
in a different judgment than the one that was entered. State ex rel 
Utah State Dept. of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 
(Utah 1983). The trial Court made an erroneous assumption on 
absolutely no substantial evidence before it that the State could 
Intervene and Set Aside an Order. 
Furthermore, the judgment by the trial Court was clearly an 
abuse of discretion as the State should have been estopped when a 
substantial injustice would result from the State's involvement 
under these unusual circumstances and there would be no adverse 
effect on public welfare. Utah State University v. Sutro & Co., 646 
P.2d 715 (Utah 1982). 
RESPONSE TO POINT II 
The Court clearly abused it's discretion by not granting 
Appellant's Rule 60(b) Motion. The results have been unjust and 
abusive to the very persons the Legislature and the Courts are 
supposed to protect. The State cannot deny that there was no need 
to Set Aside Appellant's Withhold and Deliver, if it's interest is 
to lessen cost to public welfare and dependency, and ensure that 
child support be enforced. 
The State has only allowed Mr. Poulsen, who neither contacts 
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nor cares for his children, to achieve arrearages to the children's 
detriment. Mr. Poulsen also has a working spouse and two other 
people in the home currently employed and has been able to take 
trips this summer to Hawaii and Disneyland, all while the State 
supports the robbing of Appellant's child support monies. 
The State has denied the Appellant the right to a remedy 
through the Court's as Constitutionally guaranteed to her and yet 
has shown no standing or "injury in fact". 
The Court should reverse the lower Court's decision and allow 
the Appellant to collect her child support and alimony monies, 
according to her Court Order, totaling $900.00 per month. 
The Court acted improperly in denying the Rule 60(b) Motion 
for Relief. The results have been unjust and abusive to the very 
persons the Legislature and the Courts are Aside supposed to 
protect. The State cannot deny that there was no to Set Aside 
Appellant's Withhold and Deliver, if it's interest to lessen cost 
to public welfare and dependency and ensure child support be 
enforced. 
Setting Aside the Appellant's Withhold and Deliver Order has 
irreparably injured the Appellant to collect her child support 
monies according to common-law rights and remedies, one of those 
being a restoration the Judicial Order that would allow the 
Appellant to have support monies of $900.00 per month sent directly 
9 
to her and children. 
RESPONSE TO POINT III A, B, & C and IV 
The Court did not inquire as to the proper notice requirements 
that govern all agency adjudicative actions, and to determine if 
proper notice was given and also establish necessary standing in 
the Court. 
The Court should have allowed evidence and argument, neither 
of which the State shows any proffers of, only a statute that is 
quoted in part. 
Title IV-D 651 et seq. section 666(a)(8) states that "when 
there is an availability of other remedies and other relevant 
considerations and that application would not carry out the 
purposes of either the Congress or the State Legislature that 
654(6) would be inappropriate". 
The facts supporting this very clause are: 
(A) That the Appellant had a very viable and workable Withhold and 
Deliver in place and was receiving her child support. 
(B) That the previous conduct of the parties had been one of not 
going to the State for any kind of assistance. 
(C) That Mr. Poulsen only sought refuge in the State's 
Intervention and has successfully achieved an arrearage 
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accumulation, in an amount in excess of $4,197.00. 
(D) It was neither the intent of the Congress nor of the 
Legislature to hinder and impede independence and self reliance of 
the Appellant in her efforts to actively pursue collection of her 
child support through her own honest efforts. 
(E) The Military does not send it's child support monies through 
the State but instead the Department of Treasury sends payments 
directly to the Obligee. 
(F) The Appellant simply achieved the same results through a 
Judicial Order, signed by Judge Young, to have Mr. Poulsen's 
support obligations sent directly to the Appellant, as there was no 
debt of public assistance owed by neither the Appellant, her 
children, nor Mr. Poulsen. 
The Social Security Title IV-D program was not enacted to 
abuse women and children and protect dead-beat Dads and yet that is 
the very result of the State's Intervention and Setting Aside of 
Appellant's withhold and Deliver. The State can marshall no 
evidence before this Court that their "assistance" they have 
benefitted anyone but Mr. Poulsen, as he has been "relieved" of 
$4,197.00 with that amount accruing to the detriment and not 
benefit of the five Poulsen children. 
To state that anyone for any reason, even with the intent to 
evade and defraud the very persons the State claims to protect, has 
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a right to cause such injustice, shows the State acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously in this case Sisco Hilte v. Industrial Comm'n.. 
766 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Mr. Poulsen did not apply to the State to enforce his child 
support. It was already being collected, but to hinder and defraud 
the Appellant and her children. Mr. Poulsen's 15 year old daughter 
contacted her father, for the first time in over a year and a half, 
to inquire why he was refusing to pay child support. Mr. Poulsen 
told his daughter that it was time to go on to welfare as he had a 
new life now. 
The procedural safe guards throughout the ORS have been 
invoked by the Appellant. The Appellant's not only objected to the 
State's interference in writing, but also in person (R527-273-1 
B.l). There was a written judicial order in place and the State 
intervened in bad faith as the Appellant had shown that the State's 
intervention was not needed (R527-300-l(2)(b)(iii). The Appellant 
placed in writing that she wanted NO interference from ORS and to 
terminate any further proceedings (R527-300-8(1).b). The Obligor 
does not owe the State as the Appellant has received no assistance. 
The State further does not comply with the CFR 303.11(9) as 
Appellant notified ORS in writing and also filed a Notice of a 
claim against them for interfering with the Appellant's child 
support collection. 
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The State claims that they must provide this "service" to the 
Plaintiff but discriminates against the custodial parent, the 
Appellant and her children ad refuse to close this case as pursuant 
to Congressional Federal Regulations. 
The State has not marshalled forth any evidence as real party 
in interest or right to join. 
The State neither had to establish, modify or enforce a Court 
Order pursuant to 62-A-ll-106(1). The State furthermore entered 
into a matter of which there is no evidence that the ORS had a 
right to recover anything from the judgement Order. Therefore, it 
was erroneous for the lower Court to have allowed the State to 
Intervene and not require evidence as condition of Intervention as 
in required in Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 17 and 19 to be 
strictly followed. The State provided no evidence that by not 
joining it would impair or impede it's ability to protect any 
interest, as the State can show none. 
The State did not have to help Mr. Poulsen enforce the child 
support. The Appellant effectively and adequately was enforcing 
collection of her support obligations. 
The State failed to follow proper procedural requirements. 
The Appellant would like Court to take Judicial Notice that the 
State's Ex-parte Motion to Intervene was not filed with the trial 
Court on 23 July 1992 as stated in Appellee's brief (Page 7). The 
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Appellant was not sent by U.S. mail a Notice of State's Motion to 
Set Aside Withhold and Deliver as evidenced by the Notice of 
Objections to State's Ex-parte Motion to Intervene filed 31 July 
1992. The Appellant never received any Notice of Hearings as stated 
by Commissioner Arnett and as evidenced by exhibit in Appellant's 
brief transcript of proceedings and therefore did not have an 
opportunity to be heard on the issue of the Setting Aside of 
Appellant's Withhold and Deliver. 
RESPONSE TO POINT V 
The Appellee continuously has evaded the issues of right to 
contract. 
The Appellant's Divorce Decree specifically stated that both 
the child support of $700.00 and the alimony of $200.00 were to be 
paid by wage assignment. A wage assignment is contractual in 
nature. Western v. Hodgson C.A.W., (VA 1974) 494 F.2d 379. 
The State helped support Mr. Poulsen in completing a 
fraudulent transfer, of which all essential elements of fraud 
exist: 
1. The parties entered into an agreement to voluntarily comply. 
2. When Mr. Poulsen realized that he could run to the State to 
fraudulently transfer any right to Appellant's child support to be 
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paid by Wage Assignment. 
3. The risk to the Obligor has harmed the Appellant and her five 
minor children and has saved Mr. Poulsen $4,197.00. The State does 
not help to collect these arrearages, only allows them to accrue -
therefore the transfer was made with the intent to hinder and 
delay. This was addressed in Appellant's Motion as well as oral 
argument, on 19 August 1992 before Commissioner Thomas Arnett. 
The Appellant further claims a right to petition the Court's 
for an injury done to her person and for relief from a debtor. 
CONCLUSION 
The State's intervention and Setting Aside of Appellant's 
Withhold and Deliver and because of the State's policy of 50% 
Garnishment, has not helped the very persons, the children they 
have purported to be helping. 
The Plaintiff is now over $4,197.00 in arrearages to the 
advantage of the Plaintiff and not the children. The Court should 
look to the intent of the Legislature and determine if the State 
has helped, or hindered, the rightful collection of the Appellant's 
Support monies. 
When any statute's rigid application defeats the higher 
purpose that of doing justice, then the "unusual circumstances" of 
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the case must be applied. There is no substantial adverse effect on 
public policy and the only one's injured by the State's 
intervention have been the children, who have already suffered 
great emotional and physical abuse by the Plaintiff. 
The Appellee raises the argument that the Appellant has not 
shown an abuse of the trial Courts discretion Katz v. Piece, 732 
P.2d 92,93 (Utah 1984); Baker v. Western Sur. Co, 757 P.2d 878, 881 
(Ut. Ct. App 1988). However, when a Motion for Relief from a Order 
or Judgment is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the 
District Court has no discretion; if jurisdiction is lacking, the 
Order cannot stand without denying due process to the one against 
whom it runs. See In Re Marriage of Stroud, 631 P.2d 168, 170 n.5 
(colo. 1981); 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure 2862 (1973). Therefore, the propriety of the 
jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision to grant 
relief, becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to 
District Court. See Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 
Blgmguist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989) Madsen v. Borthick, 769 
P.2d 245, 247 (Ut. 1988). 
The Appellant nowhere cites as her authority for her Withhold 
and Deliver as the Statute cited by Appellee, but instead chose to 
exercise her common-law right to obtain her support monies (see 
Withhold and Deliver dated 30 June 1992 in Appellant's Brief, 
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signed by Judge Young), the Statute being cited as the authority 
for the intervention and subsequent Setting Aside by ORS was not 
even invoked by the Appellant, but her Common-law right and 
constitutional right to the Court, the matter was adjudicated and 
Ordered by Judge Young and the ORS should be estopped because of 
res judicata. 
The Trial Court had made a Order to grant Appellant's Withhold 
and Deliver and therefore the Court lacked in rem jurisdiction to 
allow the Intervention of ORS, who entered Ex-parte under a Statute 
that did not apply in this matter. Furthermore, the Court lacked in 
personam jurisdiction, as the ORS entered without Notice to the 
Appellant. 
This appeal stems from a fraudulently obtained Divorce Decree 
by Plaintiff. To further add insult to injury, Plaintiff 
perpetuated another fraud action by applying for ORS' help in 
getting out of his obligation with the intervention of ORS and 
their subsequent setting aside of the Appellant's withhold and 
deliver. Trial court abused its discretion by denying 60(b) motion 
without giving Appellant due process. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Based upon the following facts and evidence before the 
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Appellant Court, the Appellant prays this court for a reversal of 
the lower Courts order. Grant the Appellant the right to collect 
her support monies through her own efforts or remand this for trial 
of a declaratory judgment* 
Award the Appellant the $4,197.00 that the States' 
Intervention has allowed the Plaintiff to obtain to be paid to her 
and collected, by the ORS from the Plaintiff and award the 
Appellant the costs of this Appeal and any other relief this Court 
deems just and proper. 
Respectfully submitted this day July 20, 1993. 
POULSEN, DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
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Social Security Act, 42 USCS sec. 666(a)(8): 
Procedures under which all child support orders which are issued or 
modified in the State will include provision for withholding from 
wages, in order to assure that withholding as a means of collecting 
child support is available if arrearages occur without the 
necessity of filing application for services under this part [42 
USCS, sec. 651 et seq.]. 
Notwithstanding section 454(20)(B) [42 USCS sec. 654(20)(B)], the 
procedures which are required under paragraphs (3), (4), (6), and 
(7) need not be used or applied in cases where the State determines 
(using guidelines which are generally available within the State 
and which take into account the payment record of the absent 
parent, the availability of other remedies, and other relevant 
considerations) that such use or application would not carry out 
the purposes of this part [42 USCS sec. 651 et seq.] or would be 
otherwise inappropriate in the circumstances. 
Human Services, Recovery Services, R527-273-l(B) Administrative 
Process, Non-AFDC Services. 
The bureau may limit future Non-AFDC services to enforcement 
of current support only or terminate the contract when the obligee: 
1. Objects to the results of the assessment; or 
2. Negotiates a payment schedule with the obligor without the 
knowledge or involvement of the team; or 
3. Does not comply with other terms of the Non-AFDC contract. 
Human Services, Recovery Services, R527-300-1-3 Income Withholding. 
1. .Income withholding is defined as withholding child support 
from an obligor's income. The payor of income forwards the amount 
withheld to the Office of Recovery Services (ORS). 
2. Income withholding is divided into two categories: 
a. Immediate income withholding applies to all orders issued or 
modified after October 13, 1990, which do not provide that 
immediate withholding will not occur. 
b. Initiated income withholding applies to: 
i. orders issued prior to October 13, 1990, which have not been 
modified since October 13, 1990, and 
ii. to those orders issued after October 1990, which had a finding 
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of good cause not to require immediate withholding, or 
iii. to orders issued after October 13, 1990, which had a finding 
that a written agreement between the Non-AFDC parties was 
sufficient and immediate withholding was not needed, 
3. In addition, income withholding may be initiated by service of 
an advance notice in a case which has an order issued prior to 
October 13, 1990, which has not been modified since October 13, 
1990, even though the obligor is not delinquent as defined in R527-
300-2, if: 
a. the obligor and the obligee have signed a subsequent agreement 
which the obligor has failed to meet (for example, while the order 
does not require payment by a specific date, there is a written 
agreement that payment will be made on the first day of each 
month), and 
b. the obligee request that income withholding be initiated. 
Human Services, Recovery Services, R527-300-8-1(b) Income 
Withholding Suspension and Termination. 
1* Income withholding should be terminated if: 
b. the Non-AFDC obligee terminates in writing authorization for 
ORS to collect support on her behalf, income withholding was 
administratively implemented and the obligor no longer owes child 
support to Utah or other state on whose behalf Utah is acting, and 
the obligee does not want withholding to continue. 
45 CFR Ch. Ill (10-1-92 Ed.) sec. 303.11(b)(9)&(12) Case closure 
criteria. 
(9) The non-AFDC custodial parent requests closure of a case and 
there is no assignment to the State of medical support under 42 CFR 
433.146 or of arrearages which accrued under a support order; 
(12) In a non-AFDC case receiving services under Sec. 
302.33(a)(1)(i) or (iii), the IV-D agency document the 
circumstances of the custodial parent's noncooperation and an 
action by the custodial parent is essential for the next step in 
providing IV-D services. 
(c) In cases meeting the criteria in paragraphs (b)(1) through (7) 
and (11) and (12) of this section, the State must notify the 
custodial parent in writing 60 calendar days prior to closure of 
the case of the State's intent to close the case. 
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